A

Hailemariam Desalegn, Sudan President, Omar Al-Bashir, and Egypt President, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, have been regularly repeating that its uses of the Nile water are not for consumption, but rather for power generation only, and that the water that generates the energy goes back to the course of the Nile and will remain in Egypt. The Egyptian explanation of these issues has found a lot of acceptance and sympathy in the international forums. But the justice of the cause is not alone enough to make that case. So the strategy included a number of other factors.

One of the most prominent of these factors that helped Ethiopia in its media ___ally compa- nion with the previous era. Wars with Eritrea and Somalia and within Ethiopia do not offer the same strength. So during the construction of the dam, Ethiopia started an ambitious economic program in the growth rate ratio, in the past five years, nearly 10%. This economic program included power generation from the Omo River (not part of the Nile tributaries). Therefore, the project aimed to build four power generation projects on the Riv- er Omo, and began exporting electricity to Ethiopia and to Sudan itself and then signed contracts with Kenya and the State of South Sudan for the sale of electricity as well. So the site of the project started to emerge politically and economically, marking the end of the years of drought and famine associ- ated with Ethiopia in the imagination of the world.

Ethiopia also based its strategy on the Renaissance dam on the element of surprise and choosing the right time. Ethiopia started preparations for the construction of the Renaissance dam quietly since the onset of the year 2010. Then it detonated its bombs by announcing the start of construction of the dam when it was soaked up in its ears in the Janu- ary 2011 revolution, whereas the construction of the dam was made at the end of March 2011, a few weeks after the overthrow of former President Hosni Mubarak, and before the formation of the government of Essam Sharaf (2011) that succeeded the deposed Mubarak’s government. Then Ethiopia announced the start of work in the construction of the dam after only three days of the announcement, and before Egypt and Sudan were ready to start the negotiations.

Work started on the construction of the dam with- out hesitation or delay, starting with eight thousands engineers, technicians, employees and workers, who included some of the best of the best, which created so much confusion within the Egyptian and Sudanese ranks. The Egyptian govern- ment was still finding its way to existence and the Sudanese was losing its identity due to the support of its partners and opponents of the dam, which showed a state of confusion similar to Sudan in relation to that of our brothers in the north of the Nile Valley.

The third axis, on which the Ethiopian strategy was based, is the time factor. Ethiopia grasped the opportunity and opted to benefit from the instanti- on mismatch in Egypt and worked day and night to improve it as hardwired indispensible fact in front of Egypt and Sudan and the entire world. The work went on very quickly and without interruption as scheduled by the Egyptian government. Then Ethiopia in the May 28, 2011, three days before the Interna- tional Committee of Experts submitted its report on the dam afterwards, Ethiopia diverted the course of the Blue Nile, announcing to the whole world that the Dam and the decision to build it had become an indisputable or retractable fact.

The Egyptian state of confusion was confirmed in a discus- sion of the meeting, called for by former President Hosni Mubarak, which was held in Cairo.